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The paper deals with the public procurement procedure in 
France under the Public Procurement Code. It deals with 
the basic principles of the procedure, such as equal access, 
equal treatment and transparency as well as with distinc-
tion between the contracting authority and the contracting 
entity in public procurement. It also presents the influence 
of the EU legislation on the French public procurement 
law and especially the complexity of the public procure-
ment procedure. Unlawful practices are presented in the 
final part of the paper with the emphasis on the irregular-
ities that may be ascribed either to contracting authorities 
or to economic operators or to both.
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1. Introduction – Competition and Access  
to Public Procurement
According to the definition given by the Economic Observatory for Public 
Procurement (a statutory body answerable to the Minister for the Econ-
omy), »public procurement is a generic term relating to all contracts en-
tered into by public persons to meet their needs«. This expression has 
been very frequently used over the last ten years to cover: 
–  public contracts subject to the public procurement code,
–  contracts not covered by this code, but by an ordinance of June 
6, 2005,
–  delegations of public services,
–  partnership contracts.
The economic importance of public procurement is significant because it 
represents approximately 9% of the French GDP. This paper will devote 
most of remarks to the »public purchasing« that is to say to public pro-
curement contracts. Those identified by the Observatory in 2008 amount-
ed to €68.5 billion (35.8 for State contracts and 32.7 for those awarded 
by local authorities). 
According to Article 1/I, paragraph 1, of the Public Procurement Code 
(PPC),1 »public contracts are contracts for pecuniary interest between 
the contracting authorities defined in Article 2 and the economic oper-
ators, public and private, to meet their requirements for works, supplies 
or services«. A law called »MURCEF« (Emergency Reform Measures of 
Economic and Financial nature) of 11 December 2001 stipulates that 
»contracts awarded under the Public Procurement Code are in the nature 
of administrative contracts« (Art. 2). Their litigation is therefore within 
the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court.
While the conclusion of a public service concession was traditionally dom-
inated by the freedom of the parties due to particularly marked intuitu 
1  The first PPC, which brought together the rules applicable to this subject matter, 
dates back to a decree of July 17, 1964. The Code in force today is that deriving from Decree 
n° 2006-975 of August 1, 2005. By tradition, the Code has a regulatory nature and is there-
fore drafted by the Prime Minister. The lawmaker only plays a small role in setting down of 
the rules applicable to public purchasing (whereas he has a wide jurisdiction with respect to 
public services delegations). The PPC is available online on www.legifrance.gouv.fr and is 
published by the Editions des Journaux officiels (without commentaries) and by the Editions 
Dalloz (with commentaries under the supervision of A. Ménéménis).
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personae, the call for tenders to appoint the firm with which the contract 
will be concluded is an ancient concern of the French law, specifically 
with respect to the tendering procedure. It was present under the An-
cien Régime (before the Revolution of 1789) and has consistently been 
reaffirmed subsequently. Thus, a Royal Ordinance of December 4, 1836 
provided that »all contracts on behalf of the State will be made with com-
petition and advertising«. This rule was extended to municipalities by an 
Ordinance of November 14, 1837.
The competition between businesses is based on a threefold assumption:
–  It is the most economically efficient process to provide public 
bodies with the best services at the best price;
–  It guarantees equal access for businesses to public purchasing 
and protects free enterprise and the effectiveness of competition;
–  The transparency of proceedings is a good way to prevent collu-
sion between buyers and suppliers and to combat corruption.
Based on the same premise, the action of the European Union (EU) has 
progressively extended2 the principles of advertising and equal access at 
the Community level in view of the creation of the European internal 
market. Transposed into the French law and incorporated into the PPC, 
they have profoundly changed the French law as well as the practices of 
administrations and businesses involved. It follows that in describing the 
French law, the European framework in this area is also described. 
It is impossible to describe in detail or even summarize a subtle system to 
which entire books are devoted.3 Therefore, this paper will merely brush 
the broad outlines. Although the principles are simple (Part 2), their im-
plementation is complex (Part 3) and does not prevent all deviant prac-
tices (Part 4).
2  Specifically to public service delegations, which has strongly reduced the historical 
difference just mentioned between the latter and public contracts without completely sup-
pressing it.
3   Although they do not amount to a complete bibliography, the books the reader 
should consider are Braconnier, 2007; Richer, 2010; Linditch, 2009 and Févrot, 2010. 
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2.  Simple Principles
2.1.  Equal Access, Equal Treatment and Transparency
Entrepreneurial freedom prohibits public authorities from organizing 
competition: except in regulated industries, businesses are created freely 
and decide alone of their purpose. However, this freedom imposes on 
public authorities to respect competition when acquiring goods or servic-
es from businesses.
Article 1/II, paragraph 1 of the PPC stipulates more particularly that 
»public procurement and framework agreements4 subject to this code ob-
serve the principles of freedom of access to public procurement, equal 
treatment of candidates and transparency of procedures. These principles 
ensure the effectiveness of public procurement and proper use of public 
funds ...«
Public authorities considering a purchase are required to inform the pub-
lic. All the businesses wishing to provide the service requested and fulfill-
ing the conditions laid out should be able to try their luck freely and be 
assured that the same criteria, known to them and applied without unlaw-
ful discrimination, will preside over the selection of the business that will 
be awarded the contract.
These principles have constitutional standing. The Constitutional Council 
makes them derive from Articles 6 (equality) and 14 (right of citizens with 
respect to public contribution) of the Declaration of Human Rights and 
Citizens of 26 August 1789 (spec. Decision No. 2003-473 DC June 26, 
2003). This anchoring of the principles at the top of the hierarchy of the 
French legal standards imposes compliance by legislative and regulatory 
authorities and ensures an effective protection by all French courts.
Nevertheless, they must be balanced with other constitutional principles: 
public bodies’ freedom to contract and local authorities’ freedom of ad-
ministration. Public bodies remain free to determine the needs they want 
met by contract and to define the purpose and main provisions of the 
4   Framework agreements are defined by Art 1/I, 2nd par. as »contracts concluded 
between one of the contracting authorities defined by Article 2 and economic operators, 
whether public or private, the object of which is to establish the terms and conditions gov-
erning the contracts to be awarded over a given period of time, specifically with respect to 
prices and, as the case made be, of the quantities considered«.
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contract.5 In many cases, they have some latitude to choose their partners 
and to negotiate with them. The implementation of the basic principles of 
public contracts rests more on the rules of procedure than on substantive 
rules.
2.2. Contracting Authority and Contracting Entity
In accordance with EU directives that set them apart, the PPC has a first 
part that contains »provisions applicable to contracting authorities« and a 
second, which deals with »provisions for contracting entities«. However, 
the general principles are common to both. 
Both expressions include on the one hand the State and its public insti-
tutions other than those of industrial and commercial nature, and on the 
other local authorities and local public institutions (including, this time, 
those of industrial and commercial nature). This derives from Articles 2 
and 134 PPC, which thus define the institutional scope of the Code (i.e., 
the public law bodies to whose contracts it applies). 
When do such public bodies cease to be called contracting authorities to 
become contracting entities? The change in classification is not based on 
their legal status but on the material activity they carry out; this is »one 
of the activities of network operators listed in Article 135«. This provision 
contains a long list of networks in which we find, for example:
–  Direct operation or making available to an operator of distributi-
on networks (gas, electricity, heat, water and wastewater);
–  Operation in a geographical area of extraction sites for fossil fuels 
(oil, gas, coal) and of transport terminals (airport, ports, etc.);
–  Operation or making available to an operator of public transport 
networks (rail, buses ...) etc.
We see that areas of considerable economic and social importance are 
concerned. The distinction between contracting authority and contracting 
entity was not familiar to the French law:6 it derives from the transposi-
tion of EU directives (especially Directive 2004/17). It is based on tech-
5  It will be observed that the provisions quoted often state that the contracting au-
thority decides »freely« about this or that topic.
6   The network activities concerned were for the greater part monopolistic public 
services. Before their opening to competition, the concept of contracting entity would have 
been useless.
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nical and economic characteristics that are specific to network activities 
and induces specific rules for the play of fundamental principles of public 
procurement.
2.3. The Procedure
Greatly varied (see below Section 2.3.), the procedures for concluding 
public procurement contracts are based on a common model, the one 
of the call for tender, which puts into practice the principles outlined in 
Section 2.1.
The contracting authority / entity defines »precisely« (Art. 5 PPC) the 
nature and extent of its needs before any invitation to tender. This seems 
an obvious requirement of good management, but it is also essential to 
the fairness of the procedure: the competition would indeed be distorted 
if the local authority waited to have chosen a company to determine the 
exact composition of the services it intended to entrust to it.
It also determines the main features of the service, particularly the techni-
cal specifications »that cannot entail the creation of unjustified obstacles 
to the opening up of public contracts to competition« (Art. 6). Social and 
environmental clauses may also be provided. 
This information is subject to a public notice calling for competition, the 
dissemination of which (local, national or EU level) depends on the size 
of the market (Article 57). Businesses that are interested submit their 
tenders in the form of a commitment document. They must provide all 
the documents requested of them; public administration cannot vary its 
requirements on this point according to the businesses. 
On the appointed day, the »envelopes« (the businesses’ tenders) are open 
and applications are discussed during a closed session7 at which candi-
dates are not admitted, so as to protect agents from any interference from 
them (Art. 58). 
The contracting authority shall award the contract »to the candidate who 
submitted the most economically advantageous tender« (Art. 53). It will 
base its decision either on a »plurality of non-discriminatory criteria re-
lated to the object of the contract« or »given the object of the contract, 
7  For local authorities, a tender committee (regulated in minute detail by Articles 22 
and 23 of the PPC) has jurisdiction. It was abolished for the State and public health institu-
tions by a decree of December 19, 2008.
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on the single criterion of which is the best tenderer.«8 It is therefore not 
always required to choose the »lowest tenderer« (the one who offers the 
lowest price). Abnormally low tenders can be rejected (Art. 55).
This system aims at »performance«, a word devoid of legal meaning but 
which describes an economic objective: that a good operation of the pro-
cedure makes the most efficient businesses emerge, to the best satisfac-
tion of the public interest. It combines the powers that public administra-
tion needs to fulfil, its mission with the freedom of enterprise and equal 
treatment of candidates, ensuring the transparency of the procedure and 
the dose of secrecy that is necessary for its impartiality.
3. A Very Complex System
On the foundation of these simple principles, the EU and French leg-
islators have built a nuanced system that gives the call for competition 
changing contours. Its complexity is such that only specialists can really 
master it. It is based on at least three sets of considerations.
3.1.  Complexity Related to the Scope of the Procurement 
Code
The European directives include in the concepts of contracting authority 
and contracting entity, the »public bodies« other than public legal per-
sons listed in Articles 2 and 134 PPC (see above 2.2.), at least when such 
bodies »created to satisfy specifically public interest needs which are oth-
er than industrial or commercial in nature«. Among these »public bod-
ies«are entities that, according to the French law, have either the status of 
a public law legal person9 or that of a private law legal person (such are the 
companies financed mostly or controlled by public entities or managed by 
bodies mostly appointed by them). To resolve this discrepancy of quali-
fications between the Community law and French law, and in order to 
8   In the event of equivalent tenders, Article 53 nevertheless grants a “preference 
right” within a strictly regulated framework to co-operatives and craftsmen.
9  For instance, the Banque de France, the Académie française, the Caisse des dépôts et 
consignations or the universities for their purchases linked to their specific needs in the field 
of research.
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have the latter comply with the former, it would theoretically be possible 
to amend the scope of the PPC. However, this would be in conflict with 
the fact that the contracts concerned are, in France, private law contracts 
(over the disputes of which judicial courts hold jurisdiction). The Gov-
ernment chose to enact specific provisions, Ordinance No. 2005-649 of 
June 6, 2005 concerning contracts awarded by certain public and private 
entities not subject to the Public Procurement Code and its implement-
ing decrees. Nevertheless, deep down, the rules of competition take their 
inspiration from the PPC.10
More significantly still, contracts falling under public procurement but 
which are not, legally speaking, public contracts, escape the grasp of the 
PPC and the 2005 ordinance. There are many categories. I will only men-
tion the partnership contracts11 and especially public service delegations.12 
Since the so-called »Sapin« act of January 29, 1993 on the prevention of 
corruption and the transparency of economic life and public proceedings, 
and according to its Article 38,13 public services delegations »are subject 
to an advertising procedure enabling the presentation of several compet-
ing tenders«, and multiple precautions are taken to ensure that the terms 
of the delegations do not grant the incumbent delegatee an unfair advan-
tage over his competitors. However, »the tenders are freely negotiated by 
the authority in charge of the delegating public body which, at the close of 
10  One can say just the same with respect to the contracts awarded by social security 
bodies »where the awarding process and performance terms [must abide by] the safeguards 
set out in respect of State public contracts« (Art. L 124-4 of the Social Security Code).
11  Pursuant to Article 3 of the Ordinance no. 2004-559 of June 17, 2004 on partner-
ship contracts their »awarding is made subject to the principles of freedom of access, equal 
treatment of applicants and transparency of proceedings«, just like public contracts. It is also 
“preceded by an advertising allowing for the submission of several competing tenders”, but 
proceedings are far less demanding than is the case with public contracts. 
12  Once simple, the distinction between public procurement contracts for services 
and public service delegations today creates many difficulties in its application as both con-
tracts can be so close in practice. One could say that with the public procurement contract, 
the local authority buys and pays for services to be provided to users, and that they buy and 
pay for themselves (at least in part) the services offered by the delegatee. Nevertheless, 
this brief presentation, historically accurate, would no longer fully reflect the reality. The 
»Sapin«act takes as the criterion of a delegation the fact that the remuneration of the delega-
tee is “substantially related to the results of the operation of the service (while a contractor 
is paid a price). This vague term has proven difficult to use, and today case law asks itself 
mainly who bears the heaviest operational risk: if it is on the operator, it is a delegation; if it 
is on the public body, it is a procurement contract.
13  The provisions of which concerning local authorities have been integrated into the 
Local Authorities’ General Code (Art. L 1411-1 and ff).
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these negotiations, chooses the delegatee«. The public authority therefore 
enjoys a freedom to choose between candidates and that freedom is far 
greater than what it has in public procurement contracts (where it is held 
to observe selection criteria).
3.2.  Complexity Related to Exemptions from the Scope  
of the PPC
Pursuant to Article 3 PPC, fifteen categories of contracts and framework 
agreements are exempt from the provisions of the Code.
Among them, the »in-house contracts« (also called quasi-direct operation 
or integrated provision contracts), which derive from the EU case law 
that inspired the French regulations, should be mentioned. It is impor-
tant to understand that a public authority is not obliged to call upon a 
co-contractor to meet its needs for works, supplies or services: it can take 
charge if it has the relevant means. In this case, this »self-provision« log-
ically avoids the requirements of advertising and competition since no 
business is called upon to intervene. The in house exception extends this 
situation to cases where the authority acting as a contracting power con-
cludes a contract with a legal person over which it »exercises a supervi-
sion comparable to that exercised over its own departments and which 
exercises of its activities for that authority«, for example, one of its public 
institutions without any autonomy vis-á-vis the authority, a transparent 
association or a corporation of which it owns all the equity (Article 3, 1). 
However, this is legally possible only if the in house contractor applies to 
its own contracts the contract awarding rules of the PPC or of the 2005 
ordinance. Set apart from the relationship between the authority and its 
in-house partner, competition thus reappears in the relationship it has with 
its suppliers.
Other exclusions listed in Article 3 relate to public procurement contracts 
that cannot reasonably be subject to competition because of their con-
tent, their international nature, or of the secrecy they require.
3.3. Complexity Related to the Procedure
The tender procedure summarized in Section 2.3. could be called the 
common law of invitations to tender, but the EU and French provisions 
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provide for a number of specific procedures applicable to all types of con-
tracts, or specific to some of them only.
To stick to the basics, Article 26 PPC stipulates that several »formal pro-
cedures« can be used by the contracting authority.14 Some moderate the 
requirements set out by the basic principles discussed in Section 2.1., 
while others provide for straightforward exceptions. These modulations 
vary the freedom of choice of the administration and the ability of firms 
to obtain the contract. They do not however go as far as to allow to select 
a firm and to dismiss others for unlawful reasons.
Thus, if the normal procedure is the call for tender,15 the contracting au-
thority chooses freely between open tendering (»any economic operator 
may submit a tender«) and restricted tendering (»only those economic 
operators who have been so authorized after selection may submit ten-
ders«) (Art. 33 CPC). In addition, there are cases (many but precisely 
outlined) for resorting to a negotiated procedure,16 sometimes even with-
out prior advertising and without competition, for example in the event of 
an emergency (Art. 35 CPC). This is one of the most notable exceptions 
to principles.
One should also consider »thresholds«: the scope of the rules is based on 
the financial importance of the contracts. Below a certain amount,17 it 
is possible to use an »adapted procedure« whose terms are freely deter-
mined by the contracting authority which may negotiate with candidates 
having submitted a tender (Article 28, PPC). Another threshold effect 
concerns the organization of advertising (Article 39, PPC): the more the 
market is financially important, the wider it must be (eventually up to the 
EU level). In practice, these thresholds are low,18 which reduces the scope 
of exceptions and ensures the proper dissemination of information.
14  Open or restricted tendering, negotiated procedure, competitive dialogue, contri-
butions, dynamic purchasing system.
15   »The call for tenders is the procedure through which the contracting authority 
chooses the contractor, without negotiation, on the basis of objective criteria brought to the 
prospective tenderers’ attention beforehand« (Art. 33, al. 1 PPC).
16  »A negotiated procedure is a procedure through which the contracting authority 
negotiates the conditions of the contract with one or more of economic operators« (Art. 34, 
al. 1 PPC).
17  The amounts are set by Article 26 PPC. They rank from €133,000 net of VAT for 
supplies and services for the State (€206,000 for those of local authorities which therefore 
enjoy a greater measure of freedom than the State) to €5,150,000 net of VAT for works.
18  Only the contracts below €20,000 before VAT can dispense with advertising.
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The minute detail of the provisions and the complexity of the system do 
not prevent their imperfect application. They even generate it as this gives 
rise to interpretation and induces application errors either in good or bad 
faith: this is one of the negative side effects of the system. Yet it is very 
much kept under control19 and supervised not only by national authorities 
and the EU Commission but also by unsuccessful tenderers who are quick 
to call upon the judge. Litigation is plentiful, as the administrative judges 
were granted by the legislature or gave themselves new and important 
powers to punish improper procedures. However, it is common knowl-
edge that, on the one hand, a good proportion of irregular procedures do 
not give rise to amendment or sanction because nobody complains about 
them, and on the other hand, that the legality review exercised by the 
préfet over local authorities suffers of a level of laxity often encouraged by 
the government. 
Unlawful practices may be ascribed either to contracting authorities or to 
economic operators, or to both.
4.1. Unlawful Practices of Contracting Authorities
Inevitably, it happens that public officials distort competition by favour-
ing businesses out of personal dishonesty. Such behaviour amounts to 
criminal offenses which are severely punished: corruption and influence 
peddling (Article 432-11 penal code), unlawful conflict of interest (Art. 
432-12 and -13) or specifically, violation of the freedom of access and 
equality of candidates in public procurement contracts and public ser-
vice delegations (»misdemeanour of favouritism« punishable under article 
432-14 of the penal code: two years of imprisonment of two years and a 
€30,000 fine). Such serious offenses are rare.
Most frequently, malpractices affecting competition in public procure-
ment contracts and which may render it void are due to errors which, 
however serious, are not ascribable to dishonesty. They can be explained 
by the poor knowledge of procedures, the need to correct errors in the 
project during proceedings design, the desire to use less cumbersome pro-
19  These are mainly external controls. Through a lack of skills, organization or will-
power, the internal controls of local authorities are often insufficient and of little efficiency.
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cedures, to prefer – for reasons that may be respectable – the businesses 
with which one is used to work (that already hold contracts or delega-
tions) or that employ the local workforce, and so on.
They are listed on official websites (those of the Ministry of Economy or 
of the Central Service for Corruption Prevention) to help public purchas-
ers to avoid them: artificial division of lots,20 use of inappropriate criteria 
or non-compliance with the selection criteria announced, void advertising 
and the call for tenders, excessive use of negotiated or adapted proce-
dures, abuse of regularization contracts and (frequently!) of amendments, 
irregular examination of tenders. They are quite varied!
4.2. Unlawful Practices Committed by Economic  
Operators
Unlawful practices are not committed only by the contracting authorities. 
They are also inherent to the candidates for public procurement who are 
desperate to win the contract. This paper does not deal with criminally 
punishable practices but rather with anti-competitive practices.
Under the French law (independently from EU sanctions), they are set 
out by Articles L 420-1 and sub. of the Commercial Code: cartels, abuse 
of dominant market position or abusive exploitation of a client’s or sup-
plier’s situation of economic dependency. The Competition Authority (an 
independent administrative authority) has competence to sanction such 
behaviour, including the imposition of financial penalties that can amount 
to 10 per cent of the worldwide pre-tax turnover of the company (Art. L 
464-2 Commercial Code).
The list of illegal practices sanctioned makes for a rich and varied anthol-
ogy21 in which the construction and public works industry has contributed 
20   The allotment of the contract is normally the rule and global contracts are the 
exception. »To encourage the widest competition, and unless the object of the contract 
does not allow for the identification of distinct services, the contracting authority awards 
the contract in separate lots ... To this end, it chooses freely the number of lots [taking into 
account a certain number of features]. Applications and lots are examined lot by lot ...« 
(Art. 10, par. 1, PPC). »Contracting authorities may decide to implement either a common 
competition procedure for all the lots or a competitive tendering process for each lot« (Art. 
27 III, par. 2 PPC).
21  Here is a recent example among many: different businesses submitted tenders for 
the supply of operating tables without imparting clear information to the purchasing public 
hospitals that they had become subsidiaries of the same company. Believing that they agreed 
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more than any other, most notably through the exchange of information 
on their tenders, in order to share contracts between themselves.
5. Conclusion
One may consider that competition and access to public procurement 
are adequately ensured in France. The system achieves a good balance 
between the freedom of public purchasers and the rights of candidates. 
However, its effectiveness is affected by its complexity and the instability 
of its rules, one and the other mostly due to EU directives. This is the 
price to pay for the effectiveness of the internal market of which French 
firms benefit greatly, particularly in the construction, public works and 
utilities sectors.
This paper has left out something of increasing importance, which derives 
far more from administrative case law than from the law. In all its activ-
ities, public administration must take into account competition law in 
its decisions which are likely to affect a competitive market. In terms of 
public procurement (especially for public service delegations), it must not 
provide an unfair competitive advantage to its co-contractor, for example 
by placing it in position of »automatic abuse«.
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BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT  
PROCEDURE IN FRANCE AND THE INFLUENCE  
OF THE EU LAW
Summary
The paper deals with the public procurement procedure in France under the 
Public Procurement Code. It deals with the basic principles of the procedure, 
such as equal access, equal treatment and transparency as well as with dis-
tinction between the contracting authority and the contracting entity in public 
procurement. It also presents the influence of the EU legislation on the French 
public procurement law and especially the complexity of the public procurement 
procedure. Unlawful practices are presented in the final part of the paper with 
the emphasis on the irregularities that may be ascribed either to contracting au-
thorities or to economic operators or to both at once.
Key words: public contract, public procurement procedure, EU law, Public 
Procurement Code – France
TEMELJNA NA!ELA POSTUPKA JAVNE NABAVE  
U FRANCUSKOJ I UTJECAJ PRAVA EU
Sa"etak
Rad se bavi postupkom javne nabave u Francuskoj koji se provodi prema 
Zakonu o javnoj nabavi. Govori se o temeljnim na!elima postupka, poput 
na!ela jednake dostupnosti te na!ela jednakog postupanja i transparent-
nosti. Nagla"ava se razlika izme#u tijela javne vlasti koje sklapa ugovor 
i pravne osobe koja sklapa ugovor u javnoj nabavi. Tako#er se pokazuje 
utjecaj zakonodavstva Europske unije na francuske propise o javnoj na-
bavi i posebno se nagla"ava slo$enost postupka javne nabave. Na kraju 
rada govori se o nezakonitim radnjama, s naglaskom na nepravilnostima 
koje se mogu pripisati ili tijelu javne vlasti koje sklapa ugovor ili pru$atelju 
usluge, ili pak objema stranama.
Klju!ne rije!i: javni ugovor, postupak javne nabave, pravo EU, Zakon o javnoj 
nabavi – Francuska
